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The Improved Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT) is a dynamic, 
stochastic, discrete-event modeling tool used to develop a model of the system of interest. 
In this project, we used the IMPRINT Pro Forces Module to build models of the crew of 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The basic concept underlying the development of a 
model using the Forces module is that crewmembers spend all of their time in some sort 
of “planned” activities/events. In the context of the model, this term refers to activities 
typically occurring in the ship’s daily schedule (e.g., specified times for meals, personal 
time, watch standing [for crewmembers who stand watch], training, preventive 
maintenance, sleep, etc.). These planned activities, however, are interrupted or 
“augmented” by unforeseen emergencies and events (i.e., unplanned activities to which 
the crew must respond and resolve) such as flooding, collision, equipment casualties, etc. 
Phase 1 of this effort was focused on model development for naval applications—
specifically, to validate the use of IMPRINT Pro Forces model simulations for the LCS 
manpower requirements (Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014). This phase included two tasks. 
First, to develop the design concept of a model describing the manpower requirements of 
LCS-1 Freedom. Second, to develop the appropriate manning models in IMPRINT. Phase 
1 successfully showed that IMPRINT Pro Forces could be used to estimate manning 
levels with regard to the distribution of crew rates and required qualifications (Navy 
Enlisted Classifications [NECs]) for the LCS 1 mission requirements through simulations 
of planned and unplanned events, based on actual data collected from the LCS crew. 
Building upon that work, Phase 2 further investigated the usefulness of Forces model 
simulations by focusing on determining which individual crewmembers should maintain 
particular qualifications (Albrecht et al., 2014). This study looked at one set of 
crewmembers, based on the current Preliminary Ship Manning Document (PSMD) with 
regard to crew rates, as well as required qualifications (or NECs), to determine the effects 
of normal underway operations—as well as unplanned events—on the fatigue levels of a 
typical LCS crew. The model predicts that, at current manning levels, certain critical rates 
(particularly engineers and combat systems sailors) consistently get the least amount of 
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sleep, accomplish the most amount of work, and respond to more unplanned events.  
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In the presence of changing geo-political climates, rapidly evolving technologies, 
and operational uncertainty, designing future naval ships presents a major challenge to 
the United States Navy. In addition, there is mounting pressure to reduce manning, 
accompanied by demands for increased range of missions. According to the General 
Accounting Office, a ship’s crew is considered the single largest cost that is incurred over 
the ship’s life cycle (United States General Accounting Office, 2003). Approximately 
30% of the total ownership cost of a ship can be attributed to personnel (Spindel et al., 
2000). Given the weight of manning levels on total ownership cost, it is no surprise that 
“optimization” of manning levels is a method of choice for reducing crew size. The latter 
method is clearly emphasized in the General Accounting Office (2003) report, noting that 
“one way to lower personnel costs, and thus the cost of ownership, is to use people only 
when it is cost-effective” (United States General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 1). The 
Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC), an independent civilian scientific 
advisory group dedicated to providing objective analyses to the Navy management,  
recommended that optimal human/system performance should be achieved using as few 
sailors as possible (Spindel et al., 2000). The challenge, however, is to optimize manning 
levels without degrading operational effectiveness below the minimum acceptable level. 
Over the last two decades, the United States Navy has launched multiple surface 
combatant acquisition programs including the Arleigh Burke destroyer (DDG-51), the 
DD(X) destroyer, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and the CG(X) cruiser. Projected 
manning of most of these platforms was based on crew sizes significantly reduced when 
compared to legacy and current ship designs. Under the optimal manning initiative, the 
Navy reduced the enlisted requirements and size of crews for some types of ships. The 
goals of optimal manning were to be achieved by implementing advanced technology, 
automation, and training. For example, from fiscal years 2001 through 2009, enlisted 
requirements declined by about 20% and crew sizes declined by about 16% on cruisers 
and destroyers (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010). As innovative as 
it seemed, the optimal manning concept reduced the size of crews too much, leading to 
unforeseen issues such as increased workload, failed periodic readiness inspections, and 
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decreased maintenance capability; consequently, Navy leadership reevaluated optimal 
manning as a policy. As noted by Undersecretary of the Navy Robert Work, “We have 
concluded [optimal manning] went too far . . . . The material condition of the fleet we 
believe suffered because of it” (Fuentes, 2011).  
In the case of the LCS, the initial aim was to achieve a core crew of only 40 
sailors. Following initial underway tests and evaluations, this number appears inadequate. 
Consequently, the Navy decided to increase the core crew size (i.e., the sea frame crew) 
on the LCS to around 50 personnel. This results in a total crew (core crew and sailors to 
operate the ship’s embarked aircraft) of about 88 sailors for a baseline LCS equipped 
with an Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package, compared to more than 200 
Sailors for the Navy’s frigates and about 300 (or more) for the Navy’s current cruisers 
and destroyers (O’Rourke, 2015). But the question still remains: what is the correct crew 
size for future ships and how can that number be determined before a ship design is too 
far along in the acquisition process? 
A. BACKGROUND 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 1000.16K (Department of the Navy, 
2007) describes the processes for ship manpower determination and specifies that 
personnel levels must be adequate to perform the Navy’s work and to carry out specific 
missions. To determine the manpower requirements, the Naval Manpower Analysis 
Center (NAVMAC) uses a multiphase process (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2010), based on the Navy Standard Workweek (NSWW) model, to calculate the 
minimum number of personnel required to man a ship. The NSWW represents a 
standardized version of one week of work performed by a single enlisted Sailor while at 
sea and is used to calculate manning levels, which are a theoretical reflection of the 
minimum manpower resources necessary to accomplish the ship’s mission. The 
workweek for sea duty is a guideline for sustained personnel utilization, based on the 
operational requirements under projected wartime conditions, with units in Condition III 
steaming, as described in OPNAV Instruction 1000.16K, page C-1 (Department of the 
Navy, 2007).   
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The NSWW provides guidelines for the time available per person to accomplish 
the required workload, including watches expressed in average hours per week. The week 
is divided into two categories: On Duty (or Available) time (81 hours) and Nonavailable 
time (87 hours). On Duty time refers to the time periods where personnel are occupied by 
their required duties: notionally, that amounts to watchstanding (56 hours), work (14 
hours), training (7 hours), and service diversion (4 hours). Training contributes to combat 
readiness and includes activities such as general drills and engineering casualty damage 
control. Service diversion includes quarters, inspections, sick call, and administrative 
requirements. Productive Work time (70 hours) includes watchstanding and work. 
Nonavailable time is comprised of all personal time that is allotted to sleep (56 hours), 
messing (14 hours), personal needs (14 hours), and free time (3 hours). 
Useful as it may be, the NSWW method for establishing manning has its 
limitations. As previously described, some of these limitations are associated with the 
assumptions of the model about the activities/duties of the crewmembers (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2010). The results from multiple studies conducted at 
the Naval Postgraduate School have shown that crewmembers work longer hours and 
sleep less than what is allocated in the NSWW model, suffering from significant sleep 
deprivation (Green, 2009; Haynes, 2007; Mason, 2009; Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014; 
Shattuck, Matsangas, & Brown, 2015; Shattuck, Matsangas, & Powley, 2015). 
Specifically, Haynes (2007) found that crewmembers worked, on average, 14 hours per 
day, with 85% of them exceeding the 81 hours allotted by the NSWW; whereas Green 
(2009) found that sailors worked 12.5 hours per day, with 61% of her participants 
exceeding the work hours specified in the NSWW model. Both Haynes and Green 
suggested that the NSWW model should be revised to include adequate time for rest, part 
of which is the actual time set aside for sleep (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014). Rest 
involves more than just the time dedicated for sleep, since it takes some time to 
decompress, fall asleep, and awaken. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has 
proposed a minimum of 10 hours of rest during any 24-hour period and 77 hours of rest 
for any 7-day period (International Maritime Organization, 2010). 
The NSWW model, however, has other basic constraints. First, the model 
assumes a fixed weekly amount of time for each of the activities in which a crewmember 
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is involved. Second, the model is “amnesic” because it does not incorporate the 
dimension of time as a critical component of the daily activities. For example, when an 
activity is interrupted by a critical event (e.g., scheduled maintenance interrupted by 
general quarters), the time lost from the interrupted activity is not carried over to the next 
day as a need for spending more time in that activity. Hence, it cannot address the 
“avalanche” effect characterizing everyday activities. Even if interrupted, maintenance 
tasks will need to be completed at a later time. Interrupted sleep will take its toll as an 
increase in sleep need or cumulative sleep debt. Meals can be missed, but not forever. 
These examples show that the priority and time allocated to daily activities is dynamic 
and far from being fixed: the current state depends on prior state. Furthermore, the 
NSWW model can address activities only as scheduled events; over the course of a week, 
there are specific activities, each one allocated for a fixed duration of time. Hence, the 
NSWW cannot address the impact of unscheduled events like sick or injured 
crewmembers, catastrophic events, etc. In essence, the NSWW is a static and 
deterministic model. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This effort explored the current manning levels onboard the LCS. The LCS 
platform was designed with smart ship systems, improved technology, and an innovative 
look at workload distribution across the naval workforce. The ship design applied 
reduced manning models, relying heavily on contracted and shipyard labor for both 
extensive planned and corrective maintenance. Unfortunately, inadequacies in the 
manning models may compromise the operational envelope of ship systems, exacerbate 
existing operational problems, and degrade the ability to react to unexpected events. This 
may result in reduced mission capability and degraded combat effectiveness.  
The current modeling effort is based on the notion that manpower requirements 
are an important determinant of maintenance, crew performance, morale, readiness, and, 
ultimately, the ability of the ship as a system to accomplish her mission. In order to 
understand the impact of manning decisions, we need to develop models that are better 
equipped to capture the characteristics of actual shipboard operations. The goal of the 
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current study is to provide an optimized assessment of the effect of manning on 
operational performance. 
C. APPROACH 
This project is a multiphase, multiyear effort that seeks to validate the LCS 
IMPRINT Pro Forces manning model, increase the utility of the model, and potentially 
extend its use to other maritime platforms.  
Phase 1 (2013 – 2014): Phase one of this effort was focused on developing 
manning models for naval applications. Specifically, using IMPRINT Pro Forces 
software, we developed a model of planned activities and unplanned events on the LCS. 
These results are reported in a joint Master’s thesis by Hollins and Lezczynski (2014), 
which can be downloaded at http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/41620. 
Phase 2 (2014 – 2015): Phase two of this effort involved further development and 
a proof of concept of the IMPRINT Pro Forces software program.  
This report includes the following Appendices, which represent the results of the 
two completed phases. 
• Appendix A: Project presentation. 
• Appendix B: Project report – Appropriate manning for the U.S. Navy 
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – A few good people 
• Appendix C: Project report by Robison, Smith, Stone, and White (2015).  
• Appendix C: Project report – Air warfare conducted from a Virginia-class 
submarine platform – A human factors analysis using IMPRINT software 
• This work investigates the manning requirements necessary to add the air 
warfare mission area to a VIRGINIA-class submarine. Although this work 
is not focused on the LCS, it is based on the IMPRINT Pro Forces module 
and builds on the model developed for the LCS.  





























For a detailed description of the methods involved in each of the study products, 
refer to the corresponding publications. This section will focus on the Improved 
Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT), the NSWW model, and the general 
concept underlying the development of the proposed model. 
B. MODELING WITH IMPRINT PRO FORCES MODULE 
IMPRINT has been under development by the U.S. Army Human Research and 
Development Command for over a decade (United States Army Research Laboratory, 
2010) and can be described as a dynamic, stochastic, discrete-event modeling tool. 
Hence, IMPRINT per se is not a model, but instead, is a tool used to develop a model of 
the system of interest. IMPRINT Pro integrates four software modules that can be used 
together or as stand-alone packages. IMPRINT Pro provides the means for estimating 
manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) requirements. This software tool has the 
capability to assist in identifying manpower constraints in a system by assessing 
manpower requirements or the limitations of available manpower early in the system’s 
acquisition process (Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014).  
C. NAVY STANDARD WORKWEEK (NSWW) MODEL 
The NSWW model is described in Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 
1000.16K (Department of the Navy, 2007). The NSWW provides guidelines for the time 
available per person to accomplish the required workload, including watches expressed in 
average hours per week. Although not prescriptive, the instruction notes that extending 
work hours on a routine basis could adversely affect morale, retention, safety, etc., and, 
as a policy, habitually extending work hours should be avoided (Department of the Navy, 
2007). 
A number of studies conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School has shown that 
sailors at sea work long workdays. Mason (2009) found that Senior Chief Petty Officers 
and Chief Petty Officers averaged 6.26 hours of sleep, while senior officers (Lieutenant 
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Commanders and above) slept approximately 6.4 hours per day. Another study showed 
that crewmembers of the Operations Department of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer 
working on the 6hrs-on/6hrs-off watchstanding schedule have considerably long 
workdays (on average, 15 hours on duty), which corresponds to approximately 30% more 
time on duty than the NSWW criterion (105 hours compared to 81 on a weekly basis) 
(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014). Results from a study conducted on USS Nimitz showed 
that 15% of the Reactor Department crewmembers working on the 5hrs-on/10hrs-off 
schedule worked, on average, 14 hours or more per day (Shattuck, Matsangas, & Brown, 
2015; Shattuck, Matsangas, & Powley, 2015).  
D. BASIC CONCEPT 
Throughout this project, the IMPRINT Pro Forces Module was used to build 
models of the crew of the LCS. The basic concept underlying the development of the 
IMPRINT Pro Forces model is that crewmembers spend all of their time in some sort of 
“planned” activities/events. In the context of the model, this term refers to activities 
typically occurring in the ship’s daily schedule (e.g., there are specified times for meals, 
personal time, watch standing [for crewmembers who stand watch], training, preventive 
maintenance, sleep, etc.). These activities are assumed to occur in the typical daily 
schedule. These planned activities, however, are interrupted or “augmented” by 
unforeseen emergencies and events (i.e., unplanned activities to which the crew must 
respond and resolve) such as flooding, collision, equipment casualties leading to the need 




III. PHASE 1 (2013 – 2014) 
Phase 1 of this effort was focused on model development for naval applications, 
specifically to validate the use of IMPRINT Pro Forces model simulations for the LCS 
manpower requirements. This phase included two tasks. The first task was to develop the 
design concept of a model describing the manpower requirements of LCS-1 Freedom. 
The second task was to develop the appropriate manning models in IMPRINT. These 
tasks are described in the thesis by Hollins and Leszczynski (2014).  
Input data were derived from data cards collected by the Center for Naval 
Analysis during an underway with LCS 1 Freedom in Fall 2013 and from information 
shared by the LCS Program Office, San Diego, California. Hollins and Leszczynski 
(2014) approached the problem of estimating the capability of LCS core crew sizes to 
respond to daily planned activities and unplanned events during a typical underway 
period. Using IMPRINT Pro Forces software, three different LCS core crew sizes were 
modeled (40, 50, 60 corresponding to enlisted crew size of 31, 40, and 48) to assess how 
each was able to handle day-to-day operations, maintenance, and emergencies during a 
(notional) operational underway. The results showed measurable and significant 
differences in performance among the three core crew sizes as assessed by analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and Tukey tests. As crew sizes are reduced, individual performance 
becomes increasingly important.  
Multiple watch schedules were modeled using the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling 
(FAST) software tool, which uses the SAFTE model to predict individual cognitive 
effectiveness levels using simulated work and sleep schedules. A survey was also 
administered to the crewmembers of the USS Independence (LCS 2) to assess the crew’s 
perception of the adequacy of current manning concepts and to further validate the 
IMPRINT model outputs. During the Phase 1 effort, researchers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School collaborated with Alion, the contracting agent for IMPRINT, to 
debug the software, which was still in the Beta Test Phase. Furthermore, the FAST 
predicted effectiveness suggested that individual performance is significantly affected by 
the watch rotation a sailor stands.  
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These efforts showed that IMPRINT Pro Forces module can be used to effectively 
model the LCS crew and to identify the extent to which the crew can effectively operate 
the LCS. Given the constraints of the models, the simulation results were not surprising. 
Comparisons between the models showed that the ability of the crew the respond to 
unplanned events and failures deteriorated at a statistically significant level as the crew 
size decreased. In other words, the IMPRINT Pro Forces models showed that as the size 
of the core crew increased, system performance improved (as evidenced by decreasing 
failure rates with increasing crew size) (Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014). The enlisted core 
crew of 40 consistently outperformed the enlisted core crew of 31, and the enlisted core 
crew of 48 significantly outperformed both 31 and 40. Table 1 shows the detailed results 
of the comparisons between the three different crew sizes for each of the unplanned 
events. For example, results showed that an increase of the crew from 31 to 40 enlisted 
members does not have a significant effect on the ability to respond to weapon system 
misfire events, main propulsion diesel engines (MPDE) casualty, and ship service diesel 
generators (SSDG) casualty.  
 Effect of increasing the crew in their ability to respond to unplanned Table 1.
events; adapted from (Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014). 
Event 
Does the increase in crew size make a difference in the 
ability of the crew to respond? 
31 vs. 40 enlisted 
crewmembers 
40 vs. 48 enlisted 
crewmembers 
31 vs. 48 enlisted 
crewmembers 
LINK-16/NAVY RED issues Yes No Yes 
Weapon system misfire No Yes Yes 
Network issues Yes No Yes 
RO issues Yes No Yes 
MPDE casualty No Yes Yes 
SSDG casualty No Yes Yes 
VCHT issues Yes No Yes 
WSN-7 failure Yes No Yes 
The IMPRINT model predictions were further supported by the survey 
administered to the LCS-2 crew. The survey responses clearly emphasized the need for 
additional crewmembers in the Engineering Department. Aligned with these responses, 
the IMPRINT results for the enlisted core crew of 31 (40 core crew) showed that the 
Engineering Department had the highest equipment failures due to a manning deficiency 
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(Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014). Notably, the comparisons between the three manning 
models showed significant performance improvement when changing from a core crew 
of 31 to a core crew of 40, and a profound improvement with a core crew of 48. These 
results are congruent with the U.S. Navy’s decision to increase the number of 
crewmembers on the LCS to about 50 (O’Rourke, 2015). As important as they may be, 
however, the results of this effort are not conclusive and cannot be used for manning 
decisions. These models need further work in terms of refinement of the baseline settings, 
validating of the underlying model assumptions, etc. 
Overall, the results of this phase showed that, even though focused on the crew of 
the LCS, the modeling approach and analytical process can be expanded and applied to a 
wide range of ships and departments. More importantly, though, this phase showed that 
using a model developed using the IMPRINT Pro Forces module can help inform leaders 
of appropriate crew sizes by preventing crew size overestimation or underestimation. It 
can also shorten, or even prevent, misalignment of scarce human resources and/or crew 
fatigue, and improve the precision of manpower requirements determinations for new 
acquisitions and existing platforms (Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014). For detailed 
information regarding the work done in Phase 1 refer to the thesis by Hollins and 
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IV. PHASE 2 (2014 – 2015) 
Phase 1 successfully showed that IMPRINT Pro Forces could be used to estimate 
manning levels with regard to the distribution of crew rates and required qualifications 
(Navy Enlisted Classifications – NECs) for the LCS-1 mission requirements through 
simulations of planned and unplanned events, based on actual data collected from the 
LCS crew (Hollins & Leszczynski, 2014).   
Building on that work, Phase 2 involved further development and a proof of 
concept of the IMPRINT Pro Forces software program. Specifically, the second phase 
continued the investigation into the usefulness of IMPRINT Pro Forces model 
simulations, focusing on determining which individual crewmembers should maintain 
particular qualifications (Albrecht et al., 2014). As a manning constraint, the revised 
model assumed that the total number of enlisted crewmembers onboard was 
approximately 45; officers were not modeled. This study looked at one set of 
crewmembers, based on the current Preliminary Ship Manning Document (PSMD) with 
regard to crew rates, as well as required qualifications (or NECs) to determine the effects 
of normal underway operations—as well as unplanned events—on the fatigue levels of a 
typical LCS crew.  
Results showed that at current manning levels, the model predicts that certain 
critical rates (particularly engineers and combat systems sailors) consistently get the least 
amount of sleep, accomplish the most amount of work, and respond to more casualties 
(Albrecht et al., 2014). Specifically, simulation results showed that the crew works, on 
average, 11.9 hours ± 1.18 hours, ranging from 10.7 to 13.5 hours, whereas in the model 
with casualties, the crew spends, on average, 12.0 hours ± 1.22 hours, ranging from 10.5 
to 13.8 hours, working and responding to unplanned events. These results are aligned 
with actual data collected in various studies on U.S. Navy ships (Shattuck & Matsangas, 
2014; Shattuck, Matsangas, & Brown, 2015; Shattuck, Matsangas, & Powley, 2015).  
The following diagram shows the daily requirements in man-hours for specific 
rates (see Figure 1). The SSDG casualty had the highest demand in terms of time; 




Figure 1. Mean daily demand for unplanned events (in man-hours). 
Redundant qualifications or increased manning for engineers and combat systems 
sailors are predicted to improve combat effectiveness and reduce the potential for 
mishaps. Having overly-fatigued individuals working on high-demand, critically 
important tasks can negatively impact overall crew readiness.  
Furthermore, this project identified a number of issues regarding the external 
validity of the model assumptions on its output predictions. First, there was insufficient 
data available to accurately model the distributions of the unplanned events; 
consequently, the model was unable to accurately model unplanned events (Albrecht  
et al., 2014). To the extent possible, future efforts should include a more thorough and 
exhaustive approach to model unplanned events. This goal will further strengthen the 
external validity of the model and will provide better insight about the constraints of 
manning solutions. Second, the model output is affected by the order of events in the 
trump matrix (i.e., the priorities among activities). Unrealistic priorities (e.g., sleep may 
be assigned a higher priority than “quarters”) will bias the external validity of the model 
predictions. The trump matrix must be vetted carefully through the LCS Squadron 
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(LCSRON) staff and experienced LCS sailors. Overall, the second phase of this project 
provided interesting insights into the utility of the model; however, it clearly emphasized 
the sensitivity of the predictions to the assumptions about the characteristics of the 
activities modeled. 
This second phase included one more modeling effort. Although not focused on 
LCS manning per se, it used the IMPRINT Pro Forces module to address manning 
requirements in naval systems. Specifically, this study investigated the manning 
requirements necessary to add the air warfare mission area to a VIRGINIA-class 
submarine (Robison et al., 2015). The study was constrained to investigate only two 
enlisted submarine rates in normal, underway-manning conditions. The initial hypothesis 
was that the current manning does not permit the reserve capacity to accept the additional 
workload. Therefore, there would be a need to add additional personnel to the submarine 
to manage the increased workload.  
This hypothesis was proven correct. Simulation results showed that four 
additional personnel, two from each enlisted rate studied, would be needed when a High 
Energy Laser weapon system suite is integrated into a VIRGINIA-class submarine 
platform. The additional personnel that were determined to be necessary would cost the 




























V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The first two phases provided valuable results that can be used for Phase 3 of this 
project in the 2015-2016 time frame. Phase 3 of this effort will focus on further model 
development and a systematic reevaluation of the LCS model, its characteristics, and the 
external validity of the underlying assumption. NPS will continue debugging the 
software, with the assistance of Alion, in order to increase IMPRINT Pro utility for 
conducting Monte-Carlo simulations. We will also explore the impact of unscheduled 
events on specific shipboard departments and rates. The goal of Phase 3 is the 
verification and validation of the IMPRINT Pro Forces LCS Model (i.e., to further 
develop the model, to increase the accuracy of the model parameters, and to increase its 
external validity).  
Once these are accomplished, we will be able to extend the model to other ship 
platforms. In order to extend these efforts, we will need to compare IMPRINT 
predictions with actual workload data collected from existing platforms. For these tasks, 
Phase 3 will require additional data collection to measure the workload of an actual LCS 
crew during various underway evolutions, to include unplanned events. Adjustments will 
need to be made to the existing models and comparisons made between model 
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The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was designed to be a small, reconfigurable surface 
combatant capable of countering mines, submarines, and swarm boat attacks with 
significantly smaller crew sizes than traditional combatants. A previous NPS thesis 
conducted a case study which sought to validate the use of IMPRINT Pro Forces model 
simulations in the comparison of different crew sizes and answer the question of what the 
minimum crew size should be. This study continued the investigation of the usefulness of 
IMPRINT Pro Forces model simulations while focusing on answering the question of 
which individuals of the crew should maintain particular qualifications given the current 
manning constraints of approximately 45 total crew onboard (officer numbers are not 
certain, and were not modeled in this study). This study looked at one set of 
crewmembers, based on the current Preliminary Ships Manning Document (PSMD) with 
regards to crew rates as well as required qualifications, or Navy Enlisted Classifications 
to determine the fatigue effects of normal underway operations as well as unplanned 






The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was designed to meet the present needs of the 
navy as well as those in the future. The navy must maintain its missions of power 
projection in the form of carrier strike groups and nuclear deterrence in the form of 
ballistic missile submarines. With the pivot to the East, the new navy must adapt its 
platforms to fit the challenges of that environment. The need for a multi-mission craft to 
project power on the littorals cannot be undervalued. While the navy has overcome many 
obstacles in development of the LCS platform, initial trails have revealed another major 
issue: crew manning. Many ways exist to look at the manning of ships in the Navy, but 
one must account for the dynamic interactions of the diverse rates and qualifications as a 
ship undergoes daily operations as well as contingency ones.  
 
A. STUDY OBJECTIVE 
 
The objective of this paper is to asses the current LCS manning with regards to 
the capacity to accomplish scheduled and unscheduled events during underway periods as 
well as its impact on the fatigue and readiness of the crewmembers. This information 
should empower decision makers to make appropriate choices in which members of the 
crew are most vital and if possible where adding members would have the largest effect 
to the warfighting capability of the ship-crew combination.  
 
B. PREVIOUS WORK  
 
Several previous works have results that pertain directly to the development of a 
detailed crew-manning model. IMPRINT is the software used to create a manning 
simulation. It has many upsides but, as with any software, has downsides as well. The 






1. Joint Base Station Variant 1 MOS-Workload Skill Requirements 
Analysis  
 
This analysis, conducted by the army, looks at a very specific manning problem: 
the composition of a Joint Base Station team. The army developed the joint base station 
to communicate in a small team for a forward stationed unit. The problem examined was 
to determine if a crew of three could successfully operate the proposed base station 
during a 12-hour shift.  
The study used several independent factors to analyze the base station. The 
independent variables were the configurations of the manning, the average time to 
complete a task and its standard deviation, the average complexity or difficulty of 
completing a teak along with that standard deviation. The accuracy was also looked at. 
The workload estimates were controlled as well. Dependent variables included the setup, 
programming, operation, and tear down of the base station.  
This was a very appropriate model because other experimental procedures would 
have taken much longer and not been near as accurate. The IMPRINT model used 500 
executions of the mission segment model to be accurate on the estimates of task time, 
accuracy, and workload. The process for the station was fairly simple and therefore the 
model seemed to represent the work processes very well.  
The results of the data were broken down in averages and reported in times for 
each mission. The times are then divided even further into average workload and times 
for each task for each mission. Also, average error rate was examined as well. The results 
supported the conclusion that the three person team could support the operation of the 
JBS without dipping below accuracy levels or going above workload levels.  
 
2. Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here and Why  
 
The next article examines the current state of the LCS program and how the navy 
has arrived at the current challenges in manning, capabilities, and the perceived 
capabilities gap. The article was very informal, including no citation for much of the 
information about how the navy developed the LCS.  
The author brings up a valid critique of how the LCS does not fit the mission set the navy 
currently but rather the future mission sets. While not addressing the manning issue 
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directly, the article goes into depth about many of the recent gripes surrounding manning. 
The paper is very biased and analytical but lays the groundwork for further research on 





A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW  
 
This study used a model created in a previous thesis as the basic input model. The 
model used a program called IMPRINT PRO, which is predominantly a deterministic 
model, with the exception of unplanned events, which are generated based on a set of 
stochastic distributions. Individual agents, or crewmembers in the model respond to 
simultaneous events based on a priority or “trump” matrix. This allows the crewmembers 
to respond to an emergency event instead of attending sweepers. The output of the model 
is highly dependent on the distributions defined for the unplanned events and the order in 
which events are listed in the trump matrix.  
 
B. IMPRINT PRO FORCES MODULE METHODS  
 
The model used for this study simulated a 21 day underway period. Only a single 
simulation was needed for analysis when unplanned activities were not allowed, due to 
the purely deterministic nature of the model in the absence of unplanned events. When 
allowing for unplanned events, the study conducted 100 replications of the simulation 
with different random seeds. From these 100 replications, 50 were selected for analysis 
due to the extensive time required to convert the data from the IMPRINT PRO model to 
usable data for analysis. From the single run with no unplanned events and the means of 
the 50 runs analyzed with unplanned events, the top 5 crewmembers who received the 
most sleep, least sleep, conducted the most work, and the least work were analyzed. From 
these lists, the study was able to determine which positions are over utilized and under 
staffed based on the crewmember’s qualifications.  
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1. Inputs to the Model  
 
Agents in the model, in this case, members of the crew of the LCS 1 variant were 
derived from the Preliminary Ships Manning Document (PSMD). The PSMD provided 
current specific information about crew rates and training requirements, or Navy Enlisted 
Classifications (NECs) for the LCS1 variant. This manning plan is used currently by all 
LCS 1 variant crews. Scheduled events in the model were provided based on the previous 
IMPRINT PRO model, which closely imitates the standard daily routine of the LCS crew 
in an underway environment, where certain rates are in a port and starboard, or two 
section rotation, while other watch standers are in a three section rotation. The remaining 
crewmembers are not watch standers, but do have work hours, and are able to respond to 
unplanned events, provided they possess the qualifications to respond. Unplanned events 
were created using generic categories of events, such as Fire, Flooding, WSN-7 failure, 
etc. and were taken from the previous model. Corrections were made to the stochastic 
distribution sets used in the model due to concerns about the validity of using a normal 
distribution to produce times between events as used in the previous model. To rectify 
this a Poisson distribution was adapted in all applicable areas. The final input into the 
model was the event trump matrix, which dictates the priority that all crewmembers place 
on each event type in the list of events (planned and unplanned,) in the model.  
 
2. Model Design  
 
Once the inputs were created in the model, along with modifications of existing 
inputs from the previous model, the model was set to simulate a 21 day underway period. 
21 days was used due to the fact that LCS is not intended to complete longer periods 






III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
A.  IMPRINT PRO FORCES RESULTS  
 
The initial phase of the model analyzed the impact of a standard ship underway 
schedule with no unplanned events on an LCS variant 1 crew. Following this analysis, the 
study assessed similar metric effects on the crew under the same initial schedule, with the 
addition of unplanned events, such as fires, flooding, and system casualties. From these 
runs, the study viewed quality of life metrics for each crewmember. These metrics 
included hours of sleep, hours of work and watch, and hours of free time. From the study, 
it became apparent that certain rates are overstressed in a base case with no unplanned 
events, however it became even more evident that there is a very limited set of 
individuals available to respond to a large portion of unplanned events, which resulted in 
a dramatic decrease in the quality of life of those crewmembers who possessed those 
qualifications and identified them as critical points of failure if those individuals were not 
available for the underway period. The model does not accurately model unplanned 
events, as there was not enough data available to accurately model the distributions of the 
unplanned events. In addition to this, there are still inaccuracies in the model that the 
study did not have time to address. Chief among these concerns is the order of events in 
the trump matrix. According to the model, as currently designed, a crewmember will 
select sleep before quarters and sweepers. This does not reflect reality, and constitutes a 
major flaw in the model. Given more time, the trump matrix could be re-analyzed and 
corrected such that it more accurately models the decision priorities for a typical 
crewmember of LCS.  
 
B. READINESS  
 
An investigation into the Qualifications-Rates matrix (Table B-1) yields a greater 
understanding of what qualifications are connected to which rates. On one side of the 
spectrum, nearly the entire crew is qualified as damage control response personnel. Other 
qualifications are much more sparsely distributed. The Navigation system technician 
 33 
qualification is held by the ET2 and ET1 rates. These same rates also are two of the three 
personnel qualified in communications technician. Only three Information technicians are 
manned to respond to associated unplanned events. The limited number of individuals 
with specific qualifications who can respond to casualty events becomes problematic 
when viewed against the requirements for each unplanned casualty events. 
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Table B-1. IMPRINT Pro Forces Model Qualifications for LCS Manning 























BM2 E5 BM – Boatswain’s Mate     TRUE    
BM3 E4 BM – Boatswain’s Mate     TRUE    
BMC E7 BM – Boatswain’s Mate     TRUE    
CS1 E6 CS – Culinary Specialist 
 
    TRUE    
CS2 E6 CS – Culinary Specialist     TRUE    
CS3 E4 CS – Culinary Specialist     TRUE    
DC3 E4 DC – Damage Controlman     TRUE  TRUE  
DCC E7 DC – Damage Controlman     TRUE  TRUE  
EM1 E6 EM – Electricians Mate     TRUE    
EM2 E5 EM – Electricians Mate     TRUE    
EN1 E6 EN – Engineman  TRUE   TRUE    
EN2 #1 E5 EN – Engineman  TRUE   TRUE    
EN2 #2 E5 EN – Engineman  TRUE   TRUE    
EN3 E4 EN – Engineman  TRUE   TRUE    
ENCS E8to9 EN – Engineman  TRUE   TRUE    
ET1 E6 ET – Electronics Technician   TRUE  TRUE    
ET2 #1 E5 ET – Electronics Technician   TRUE  TRUE TRUE   
ET2 #2 E5 00A – Placeholder   TRUE  TRUE TRUE   
FC1 E6 FC – Fire Controlman     TRUE   TRUE 
FC2 #1 E5 FC – Fire Controlman     TRUE   TRUE 
FC2 #2 E5 FC – Fire Controlman     TRUE   TRUE 
FCC E7 FC – Fire Controlman     TRUE   TRUE 




























GM2 #1 E5 GM – Gunner's Mate 
 
    TRUE    
GM2 #2 E5 GM – Gunner's Mate     TRUE    
GSE1 E6 GSE – Gas Turbine Systems Technician – Electrical         
GSM2 E5 GSM – Gas Turbine Systems Technician – Mechanical     TRUE    
HM1 E6 HM – Hospital Corpsman         
HT2 E5 EN – Engineman     TRUE  TRUE  
IT1 E6 IT – Information System Technician    TRUE TRUE    
IT2 E5 IT – Information System Technician    TRUE TRUE    
IT3 E3 IT – Information System Technician    TRUE TRUE    
LSC E7 SK – Storekeeper     TRUE    
OS1 E6 OS – Operations Specialist TRUE    TRUE    
OS2 E5 OS – Operations Specialist     TRUE    
OSC E7 OS – Operations Specialist TRUE    TRUE    




The Unplanned event table yields even more information about the way that 
IMPRINT handles unplanned events. The table shows the list of unplanned events on the 
left. Each event is distributed during each simulation with a Poisson distribution, where 
applicable. The chart shows the number of crew that is required to respond along with 
what qualification these must maintain. For example, if fire occurs onboard, 8 Damage 
Control personnel are required to respond. If that does not occur, then the ship fails the 
fire response and ship readiness suffers. In comparison, if there is a WSN failure, the 
desired number of personnel is 2 Navigation Systems Technicians. The required number 
of Navigation Techs is 1. These results are shown in Table B-2. 
 
Table B-2. Unplanned Activity required qualifications 
Unplanned Event Qualification Required Desired 
CENTRIX Computer Software Tech 1 1 
Fire Damage Control 8 10 
Flood Damage Control 8 10 
Link 16 Communications Tech 1 2 
MPDE Aux Systems Tech 2 4 
Network issues Communications Tech 1 2 
RO Aux Systems Tech 2 4 
SSDG Aux Systems Tech 2 3 
VCHT VCHT Team 1 1 
WSM misfire Weapons Systems Tech 2 2 
WSN-7 Navigation Systems Tech 1 2 
 
After looking at the inputs and setup of IMPRINT, the simulations were 
conducted and their results were examined. The limitations from the above discussion are 
further supported by running IMPRINT. The mean daily man-hour requirements show 
that the SSDG casualty has the highest amount of time in response by personnel. This is 
one of the qualifications that is very limited on the ship. Aux systems techs are required 
to respond. While the engine room has five personnel with this qualification, they also 




Figure B-1. Mean Daily Man-Hour Requirement for Casualties 
 
As shown in Figure B-2, the 21-day simulation shows a similar story. The mean 
man-hour requirement over that time shows similar trends in time spent on responding to 
unplanned events. The SSDG is by far the largest requirement on a very few personnel. 
While flooding and fire take the second and third place for man-hour requirements, there 
are also the most amount of responders with qualifications to meet these events 
successfully. Therefore, the top three most critical casualty events for man-hour 





Figure B-2. Mean total man-hour requirements over 21 days 
 
Finally, the mean failed activities over 50 simulations show that SSDG and 
VCHT failures were the most often failed unplanned events. The crews for these 
unplanned events are limited and already overused in planned activities. It is not just 
number of people that are important on the LCS. Rates and qualifications have a 




Figure B-3. Mean number of failed activities in 21 days 
 
One point to note in this result is that watch standing had a higher priority than 
handling casualties. Because of this the simulation could not have someone relieve a 
watchstander with a pertinent qualification, like Aux Systems Tech, in order to handle an 
SSDG Casualty or RO Issue. Therefore, the simulation results of failed activities, while 
informative, lose some of their emphasis as compared to the analysis of man-hour 
requirements and the overall effect of casualty events upon crew time demands.  
 
C. DEMAND ON CREW  
 
Based on average values of simulation runs made in both a base case (no casualty) 
mode, as well as with unplanned events included, there is an appreciable difference 
between the amount of time crewmembers are allowed sleep, the amount of time they are 
afforded free time (including time to eat, relax, and focus on hygiene), and the amount of 
time the crewmember spends working or on watch. On average, in the crewmembers 
spend 7.494 hours sleeping in the base case, and 7.544 hours sleeping in the casualty case 
(standard deviations of .526 and .584 respectively). This increase in sleep between a more 
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relaxed model and the more challenging one is believed to be another artifact of the 
priority trump matrix, whose issues are highlighted earlier. More telling are the minimum 
sleep values, drop from 6.75 in the base case, to 6.68 in the casualty model. The 
maximum sleeper in the base case gets 8.23 hours of sleep, and 8.53 hours in the casualty 
included model. The increase is again due to errors in the trump matrix. The crew works 
11.89 hours on average with a minimum of 10.67 and a maximum of 13.54 (standard 
deviation of 1.18 hours), whereas in the model with casualties, the crew spends 11.95 
hours on average, with a minimum of 10.47 and a maximum of 13.83 hours (standard 
deviation of 1.216 hours) working and responding to unplanned events. The fact that the 
average crewmember spends practically 50% of every given day working, on watch or 
responding to casualties is a major indicator of over-work and eventual crewmember 
fatigue. Below is a visual representation of the time spent sleeping, working, or enjoying 
free time for the average sailor, the minimum sailor, and the maximum sailor for both the 
base case and the casualty response case. These results are shown in Figure B-4. 
 
 
Figure B-4. Simulation study hour results 
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Based on the above information, the question arose during the study: which 
crewmembers were experiencing the least sleep and the most work. Further, in the 
casualty response case, was this a result of the specific crewmember possessing 
qualifications and training that made that crewmember a critical factor? In the below 
table, you will see that those members who are underlined in the unplanned events list are 
members who were not in the top 5 lowest sleepers, or most workers until unplanned 
events were added in. While the list of the top 5 lowest sleepers and hardest workers in 
the base case are likely a result of poor watch plan management and low crew numbers, 
the primary factor resulting in low sleep and high workloads in the unplanned event 
model is the lack of enough casualty response qualified individuals. While the crew is 
likely to have every member qualified in damage control, the specific casualties to 
engineering plant systems and combat systems, which all require extensive training and 
NEC qualifications do not have a deep enough bench of qualified responders on the LCS 
to continue operations during a 21 day underway period without adding additional strain 
on the crewmembers, above and beyond an already excessively fatiguing daily routine. 
 
 Baseline Unplanned events 










EN2, DCC, IT3, GM1, 
GM2 
6.8 





EN1, EN2, IT3, FC1, 
DCC 
13.5 
QMC, EM1, OS1, IT3, 
DCC 
13.5 
Casualties N/A N/A 








A.  FUTURE WORK  
 
This study considered only the current approved case of LCS variant 1 manning 
with current training requirements. Future studies could consider fatigue effects on 
increased or decreased manning levels, a more robust and accurate unplanned activity 
design, and a more accurate trump matrix. Future studies could also consider the 
possibilities of adjusting training requirements for existing crewmembers as well as 
adjusting actual crewmember numbers. Finally, the results should be validated against 
surveys provided to current crews and LCS leadership.  
 
B.  IMPRINT PRO  
 
The following paragraphs describe further improvements specific to IMPRINT 
Pro implementation. 
 
1. IMPRINT Pro Unplanned Activity Mean Time Implementation 
 
One of the first things that the case study team attempted to resolve was to 
analyze an accuratestochastic distribution for unplanned events. Given the short time 
allowed, this study was unable to obtain any data from the Navy safety center, or other 
locations to verify the distributions. With more data and time, a comprehensive review of 
unplanned activities could be completed, lending more validity to the results of the study. 
Several of the distributions in the model were originally designated as normal, which 
could allow for negative times between events, as well as not being memoryless, and 
potentially having end effects in the tails that were not intended. This study made several 
corrections to the distributions that existed in the initial model, but due to some 
limitations with the IMPRINT Pro software where the simulation would fail on Poisson 
distributions with mean times near or greater than 21 days, not all the distributions were 
able to be fixed.  
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2. IMPRINT Pro Batch Running and Reports 
IMPRINT Pro batch running capabilities are fairly limited at this time. While the 
company is working on correcting much of the feedback from our study, the issues the 
study encountered were many. The batch runner could only complete 35 runs at a time, 
and attempts to complete more runs in a single command would result in an error. To 
counter this, our team conducted batches in groups of 10-20. Each subsequent run would 
take the initial random seed input and simply increment by 1 providing results that were 
not entirely random, and potentially creating highly correlated series of results. To 
counter to this was that after each batch of 10-20, a new seed was used in the base file for 
the batch runner. Finally, the reports that were created by the batch runner were in an 
INPRINT Pro specific format, which required approximately 40 seconds for each 
simulation run in order to receive in a format which could readily be manipulated by post 
processors (in the case of this study, excel and python). During those 40 seconds the user 
was required to navigate several menu options, and this for each individual simulation 
run conducted, which all could easily be automated.  
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The research conducted in this project investigates the manning requirements 
necessary to add the air warfare mission area to a VIRGINIA class submarine. It was 
assumed that the current manning does not permit the reserve capacity to accept the 
additional workload. This hypothesis was proven correct and 4 additional crewmembers 
were needed to return the personnel utilization to that of the current submarine baseline. 
The additional personnel that were determined as necessary would cost the VIRGINIA 
class submarine program approximately $500 million dollars in simply their pay alone. 
Other observations from the research are also included. 
The research was conducted using the Improved Performance Research Integration Tool 
(IMPRINT) and constrained to investigate only 2 enlisted submarine rates. The research 
only investigated normal underway manning conditions. Future implications of this 
research include the recommendations for the addition of personnel and specific rates or 






 The U.S. Navy is researching and developing the use of High Energy Lasers 
(HEL) on many types of platforms that are currently available. The Navy is also looking 
at various ways to implement lasers onto many future platforms since this weapon is 
capable of unlimited ammunition and therefore does not require additional logistics 
outside of its regular operations and maintenance. OPNAV N97 has asked the Naval 
Postgraduate School to conduct research and analysis into the concept of integrating a 
HEL onto a submarine platform. This request for analysis did not include any discussion 
or need to research the area of the submarine’s personnel involved, though it is quite 
obvious that this is a major human systems integration task that the Navy is indirectly 
asking to research. 
 The use of a HEL onboard a submarine proposes the question, what for? The two 
main threats initially considered are very small surface boats and slow moving unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV’s) such as the Harpy. While there are many other threats and uses 
for a laser onboard a submarine, only the aerial threat will be considered for this project. 
The aerial threat is considered because it is the threat that will force the submarine to 
conduct what could be easily argued as a new warfare area – air warfare. With focused 
consideration to the air warfare area this will allow analysis to encompass the more 
extreme case that would help determine the maximum challenge presented for human 
system integration with a HEL and a submarine. A submarine does not currently employ 
technology to conduct attacks at any type of aircraft. Therefore, many new systems will 





Current Virginia class submarine manning and watch team coordination is not 
suitable to conduct the additional air warfare mission area that standard surface 
combatants are capable of conducting. Additional personnel are going to be required 
onboard the submarine in order to implement the HEL and its complementary equipment 
into the standard submarine’s combat weapon suite. Without additional personnel to 
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augment the current watch teams and maintenance, the HEL will be required to become 
much more autonomous (more machine, less human interactions) than it more than likely 
is being designed for. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Research has been conducted in several areas regarding the overall crew-manning 
concept. The research that has been previously performed seemed to focus on the entire 
ship’s manning and how different overall crew numbers would alter the performance of 
the ship as a whole entity. This particular study is focused on a submarine’s control room 
watch-standers and the personnel assigned to perform maintenance on the expected new 
systems. Moreover, since there was no specific, directly related research that could be 
found the following documents helped to frame the overall project of implementing air 
warfare onto a submarine from a human systems integration perspective.  
 
A. USN MANPOWER DETERMINATION DECISION MAKING: A CASE 
STUDY USING IMPRINT PRO TO VALIDATE THE LCS CORE CREW 
MANNING SOLUTION.  
 
 The Littoral Combat Ship has become a case study in many areas from its 
designed mission use to its expected crew size. This project centered on the overall 
manning of the LCS platform. IMPRINT Pro Forces software was used to analyze three 
different crew sizes in order to assess the most optimal number of crewmembers. This 
project further analyzed the individual cognitive effectiveness of the members using 
simulated tasking schedules. This additional step helped to provide additional validation 
to the results of the three crew size comparison study. The main objective of this project 
was to assess the human performance software, its applicability, and capability to help 
predict optimal future ship manpower levels. 
 A review into the three core crew sizes was conducted because of the hypothesis 
that the current manning is not optimal for the LCS platform. The reduction in manning 
on previous ships has led to their failing inspections and not being combat ready because 
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of the concept that less work will be needed because of the higher technological 
automation. Since it became a concern to both the Navy and the Congress that ships may 
not be able to complete their expected service life if these failures were to continue, the 
idea of reduced manning has become more of an “optimal manning” strategy. It was 
further found that the smaller a crew size was made that the less of an ability they had to 
absorb additional work that was not initially presumed to matter. 
 Finally, the previous work performed in this thesis project helped to provide a 
framework for the challenge of implementing air warfare onto a submarine platform. The 
thesis describes a detailed analysis into how to apply data inputs into the IMPRINT Pro 
Forces module and the types of outputs and analysis to expect to be conducted and gained 
through this study. 
 
B. FEW GOOD PEOPLE FINAL REPORT 
 
 This project followed on the work of the previous thesis case study just discussed. 
The focus of this project was to determine the optimal spread of qualifications among the 
individuals of the LCS crew based upon the current core crew manning concept. The 
project centered on the fatigue levels of the crew to determine the adequate critical 
manning given the current crew constraints from the Preliminary Ship’s Manning 
Document. The results concluded that certain rates were very critical because of the 
limited quantity of qualified personnel based upon unplanned events such as casualties 
that arise during a deployment period. Also, the level of fatigue between various rates 
was significant as some rates averaged almost double the workload compared to other 
rates. Furthermore, this work helped to continue to validate the framework for 
implementation of the air warfare area onto a submarine using IMPRINT Pro Forces 
module as the analysis tool. Valuable lessons were taken away from this material about 
the use of the IMPRINT software as to what it is capable of doing and more importantly 




C. Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, OPNAVINST 
1000.16K CH-1 
 
 This document provides the overall guidance on manpower policies and 
procedures as the title indicates. Specifically, the take-away from this was Appendix C, 
the Navy Standard Workweeks section. This provides the baseline number of hours that a 
member of the Navy, onboard a ship, is expected to be capable of performing. The 
document states “they are guidelines for sustained personnel utilization…and are not 
intended to reflect the limits of personnel endurance.” This is an important statement 
although for this project the NSWW will be considered the limit for personnel activity 
and beyond that limit additional personnel will be needed. These quantified hourly values 
are then applied to the required operational capabilities and projected operational 
environments documents in order to determine the number of required personnel a ship 
needs to perform its mission. This leads to the creation of a Ship’s Manning Document 
which lists out the various ranks and rates each ship is expected to have in order to fulfill 
its designed mission set. 
 The NSWW that has been used in the analysis of this project was the Afloat 
(Wartime) for military personnel workweek which assumes a three-section watch rotation 
under Condition 3 wartime steaming. The workweek will be discussed in further detail 
during the analysis portion of this project but it separates an individual’s time into three 
main categories; watch, training, and non-available (personal) time. Each of these 
categories will be shown to be important in the overall project’s analysis of air warfare on 




A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
  
Research was conducted in order to obtain various Navy surface combatants’ 
manning documents in order to determine the critical, wartime number of personnel 
required to conduct various air warfare mission areas. Ship’s manning documents were 
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obtained from the different types of naval platforms and thoroughly reviewed to isolate 
the specific personnel required to operate the functional areas of air warfare. Based upon 
the optimal manning strategy that the Navy currently uses to fully man each ship, the 
number of personnel will be based upon Condition 3 watches. Condition 3 watches are 
the required watches to man the ship in normal underway mission conditions. It was also 
important to determine the number of maintainers needed for the equipment. Additional 
data was obtained to determine the number of submarine control room personnel required 
to perform current required operations. The Virginia class submarine’s Ship’s manning 
document was obtained and narrowed down to focus on the rates or navy enlisted 
classifications of interest for the air warfare and laser system operations. 
Assumptions were made regarding the specific mission areas that would apply to 
the implementation of air warfare onto a submarine from what a surface combatant can 
perform against air threats. This step was essential in order to narrow down the massive 
amount of systems that a submarine would need if it were to conduct the full complement 
of air warfare that for instance a destroyer is capable of performing. 
The project team decided after researching different weapons systems and warfare 
areas that the VIRGINIA Class submarine and a new AEGIS Baseline 7.1R ARLEIGH 
BURKE destroyer (DDG-51) most accurately represent the submarine class that would 
have a laser system installed and the surface class of ship to use for an analogy to air 
warfare. This decision was based on multiple criteria including the COTS baseline 
architecture of both ships, the similarities in crew training in new computer systems 
technology, and that these are the premiere platforms for each warfare area respectively 
in terms of design, capability, and new technology. 
 The research conducted will be able to provide the expected number of additional 
personnel required to perform the smaller sub-sections of air warfare. Based upon the 
Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) it will be possible to more specifically determine 
the required number of well-defined hours that these additional personnel will be 
expected to perform or present to the submarine. 
 Using the Improved Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT) software 
it will be possible to determine based upon the current submarine manning the effects of 
adding the additional workload presented by the air warfare mission area to the current 
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submarine’s personnel. The IMPRINT software will help to determine if additional 
personnel are needed to perform the day-to-day operations onboard a submarine with an 
integrated HEL. This process will require an iterative approach using the software in 
order to determine the most optimal performance model between additional personnel 
and having current onboard personnel work more. 
 Finally, a detailed analysis will be conducted to determine the recommended 
number of additional submarine personnel that will be required in order to conduct air 
warfare. The requisite number of additional personnel will only be considered to reduce 
the increased workload due to the laser system integration not to reduce the potentially 
already overworked crew. 
 
B. IMPRINT PRO FORCES MODULE METHODS: BUILDING THE 
MODELS 
 
A baseline model was created using IMPRINT Pro software, specifically the 
Forces module, for the particular rates that will be required in the conduct of air warfare 
and the operations of the laser system onboard a submarine. The submarine rates were 
chosen based upon the current rates onboard a submarine defined by the experience of 
which rate should be most capable and would be considered to be expected of conducting 
the air warfare mission area provided the additional training to do so. This baseline model 
was designed around the planned and unplanned events that are of particular importance 
to only the rates chosen. Then the baseline model was evaluated to determine the overall 
outlook of the assumed current VIRGINIA class submarine operations for these rates. 
This baseline will be used as the objective for the additional manning impact to achieve. 
In other words, if the VIRGINIA class submarine has sub-optimal manning conditions in 
the baseline, the project’s goal is not to correct existing manning concerns. The project’s 
goal is to avoid creating additional sub-optimal manning conditions with the introduction 
of the Air Warfare mission area. 
 
 1. The Baseline Model Construction and Assumptions 
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The combat systems or control room personnel members for the VIRGINIA Class 
submarine were obtained from the Ships Manning Document (SMD). The analogous air 
warfare ratings from the DDG-51 Class were taken from the ship’s Fleet Management 
and Planning System (FLTMPS) report for air warfare from DDG-112. The baseline does 
not include the inputs for the air warfare systems, but the analogous ratings that are going 
to be affected needed to be identified to form the baseline. It was determined that the 
Submarine Fire Control Technicians (FT) and Electronic Technicians (ET) were the 
analogous rates to the air warfare systems operators and maintainers required from the 
DDG-51 class Fire-controlman (FC), Electronic Technicians (ET), and Operations 
Specialists (OS). The FT and ET manning for the Virginia class was used as an input into 
the IMPRINT forces model. Deciding which ratings would be involved in the new laser 
system if it were installed was the first step. The next step was to develop a model of 
their daily activities while underway in condition 3. This model consists of maintenance, 
eating, sleeping, watch rotation, personal time, casualties, drills, briefs, and training. The 









Table C-2 below provides the assumed inputs for the baseline model to include 
the manning, roles, and unplanned events. The watch-standers (ET’s and FT’s) were 
assumed to be on a 3-section rotating watch with an off-watch maintenance period 












Table C-2. Submarine unplanned events baseline. 
 
Item Purpose Quantity or Frequency Duration 
Electronic 
Technicians 
Radio Operator, Radio 
Tech, Radio 
Maintenance, 
Electrical Tech, DCT 




Fire Control Operator, 
FT Tech, FT 
Maintenance, Network 
Tech, DCT 





Fire and Flooding 
Response 




throughout the combat 
system 
Mean: 5 Days 20 hours 
Std. Dev: 6 Hours 
(Norm Dist.) 
Mean: 3 Hours  
Std. Dev: 2 Hours 
(Normal Dist.) 
FT Casualty Summary of all FT 
related system 
casualties 
Mean: 14 Days 
(Poisson Dist.) 
Mean: 1 Hour 




Summary of all ET 
related casualties 
Mean: 10 Days 
(Poisson Dist.) 
Mean: 1 Hour 




Summary of all 
tactical network issues 
Mean: 6 Days 17 Hours 
Std. Dev: 6 Hours 
(Normal Dist.) 
Mean: 30 Minutes 
Std. Dev: 30 Minutes 
(Normal Dist.) 
Fire Fire casualty Mean: 2 Days 2 Hours 
Std. Dev: 6 Hours 
(Normal Dist.) 
Mean: 3 Hours 
Std. Dev: 1 Hour 
(Normal Dist.) 
Flooding Flooding casualty Mean: 3 Days 19 Hours 
Std. Dev: 6 Hours 
(Normal Dist.) 
Mean: 3 Hours 
Std. Dev: 1 Hour 
(Normal Dist.) 
Maintenance All FT and ET 




2 Hours for every 
maintenance watch 
requiring 2 techs. 
(Normal Dist.) 







 2. The Laser Air Warfare System Model Construction and Assumptions  
 
The additional air warfare mission area planned and unplanned events were now 
added to the previously built baseline VIRGINIA class submarine model. The additional 
systems were a laser weapon, the laser fire control system, cooperative engagement 
capability (CEC), and tactical data link 16 (Link 16). The laser weapon and Link 16 were 
assigned to the Electronic Technicians (ET). The laser fire control system and CEC were 
assigned to the Fire Control Technicians (FT). The tasking assignments were determined 
based upon technical rating competency and experience. The overall daily schedule was 
not changed with the exception of 30 minutes for each maintenance watch section added 
to both ETs and FTs to conduct maintenance on the additional air warfare systems. The 
introduction of the new systems for the Laser Weapon System was implemented through 
either their frequency of operation or a certain periodicity for maintenance and potential 
issues. Since none of these systems currently exist on a submarine the frequency of 
occurrence was determined from surface ship combatants and previous operating 
experience. Table 3 below summarizes the model with the additional inputs to the 




Table C-3. Additional Air Warfare unplanned events 
  
Item Purpose Quantity or Frequency Duration 
CEC Issues System casualty or 
operator issues 
responded to by FT 
Mean: 2 Days 
(Poisson Dist.) 
Mean: 10 Minutes 




System casualty or 
operator issues 
responded to by ET 
and FT 
Mean: 5 Hours 
(Poisson Dist.) 
Mean: 10 Minutes 





Summary of all laser 
system casualties 
responded to by ET 
and FT 
Mean: 14 Days 
(Poisson Dist.) 
Mean: 1 Hour 




AW Team identified 
from techs and 
operators to support 
live firing event 
responded to by FT 
Mean: 17 Days 
(Poisson Dist.) 





responded to by ET. 
Mean: 1 Day 17 Hours 
Std. Dev: 6 hours 
(Normal Dist.) 
Mean: 2 Hours 
Std. Dev: 1 Hour 
(Normal Dist.) 






2.5 Hours for every 
maintenance watch 
requiring 2 techs. 
(Normal Dist.) 
 
3. Model Execution 
  
 The baseline model was simulated in order to determine the VIRGINIA class 
submarine’s initial baseline with the assumptions made regarding their current 
operational profile. The project’s goal is not to correct current deficiencies to any facet of 
the VIRGINIA class submarine’s current manning levels, daily tasking, watch rotations, 
or manpower utilization. The initial step of the project is to use the initial baseline data as 
the achievable objective when adding the additional air warfare mission area by not 
failing more events or over utilizing the current manpower. After the baseline has been 
established the laser system and its associated air warfare supporting systems will be 
added to the baseline with no additional manpower to determine the impact of the added 
systems in terms of manpower activity, inactivity, and event success. Once the data is 
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compared to the baseline data the project team will be able to determine if more 
manpower will be needed for the additional systems or the current baseline manning is 
enough to absorb the air warfare mission area. If an increase in manning is determined as 
necessary the model will be simulated again increasing either an FT or ET member in the 
manning structure as necessary to achieve the baseline event success without over-
utilizing a crewmember.  
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
A. BASELINE MODEL RESULTS 
 
The Baseline Model inputs as defined in the methodology section were simulated 
using the IMPRINT Forces model for a 150 day run. The 150 day run was chosen 
because it was easier to calculate the necessary statistics from the larger data set than to 
simulate the model multiple times on a weekly schedule. The project team decided to not 
restart events that were interrupted due to a higher priority event. If the event could not 
be resumed and completed in the time remaining after the interruption was satisfied then 
that event would fail. It was decided to perform the simulation in this manner versus 
restarting events because in reality on a ship some of the interruptions would get restarted 
in the schedule and some would be lost or moved to later in the schedule though the team 
could not exactly figure out how to make this occur. This is typical with shipboard 
preventative maintenance. If an event interrupts maintenance it will be restarted when a 
time slot exists, moved farther out, or cancelled. Since the Forces model could not 
dynamically capture these multiple scenarios, it was decided to fail the event and 
analytically account for the failure time. The event activity status summary for the 
Baseline Model produced the following results seen in Table C-4.  
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Table C-4. Baseline Activity Status Summary 
 
Unplanned Activity Scheduled Started Successful Interrupted Delayed Failed 
Electrical Casualty 15 15 15 0 0 0 
Fire 5 5 5 0 0 0 
Flooding 7 7 7 0 0 0 
FT Casualties 10 10 10 0 0 0 
Maintenance 964 920 856 64 0 44 
Network Issues 144 139 139 0 0 5 
Radio Casualties 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Training 50 47 47 0 0 3 
Total Failures 52 
 
 It can be seen from the activity status summary in Table C-4 that a total of 1209 
events occurred with 52 failed events. A two-part analysis is required to achieve an 
accurate snapshot of the model’s performance. The second piece of data to analyze is the 
utilization of the personnel in the model. Since the project team decided to not restart 
interrupted events this would intuitively mean that the utilization ratios would only be 
covering the events actually completed. Multiple techniques were used to analyze the 
individual resource data to determine utilization. Tables C-5 through C-7 took averages 
of all personnel, averages of the electronic technicians, and averages of the fire control 
technicians. The average resource data was normalized to a 168-hour week. This resulted 
in the following figures of data. It is important to note that not only was the average hours 
determined for each enlisted rate but the worst case or the extreme was also analyzed. 
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All Total Hours Avg Hours per Day Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1134.07 7.56 52.92 48.09
Watch 1098.60 7.32 51.27 46.59
Sleep 941.46 6.28 43.93 39.92
Maint 309.81 2.07 14.46 13.14
Watch Prep 91.58 0.61 4.27 3.88
Training 32.00 0.21 1.49 1.36
Network Issues 27.57 0.18 1.29 1.17
Electrical Casualty 17.14 0.11 0.80 0.73
Flood 9.75 0.07 0.46 0.41
Fire 8.67 0.06 0.40 0.37
Radio Casualties 2.87 0.02 0.13 0.12
FT Casualties 2.94 0.02 0.14 0.12
Eat 285.40 1.90 13.32 12.10
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.69 1226.86 8.18 127.63 115.98
Electronic Technician (ET) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 968.65 6.46 45.20 43.22
Watch 1098.99 7.33 51.29 49.04
Sleep 956.66 6.38 44.64 42.69
Maint 305.80 2.04 14.27 13.64
Watch Prep 92.18 0.61 4.30 4.11
Training 27.50 0.18 1.28 1.23
Network Issues 11.82 0.08 0.55 0.53
Electrical Casualty 15.62 0.10 0.73 0.70
Flood 9.72 0.06 0.45 0.43
Fire 7.58 0.05 0.35 0.34
Radio Casualties 2.87 0.02 0.13 0.13
Eat 267.81 1.79 12.50 11.95
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.67 1224.47 8.16 118.57 113.36
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The worst case individual resource utilizations can be seen in Tables C-8 and C-9. 
This was done as a way to prevent the averages from essentially smoothing over the 
extremes in the data sets. Therefore, the worst case individual was determined by finding 
the crewmember who obtained the least amount of sleep. Although it is simple to say that 
this would be the worst case member but this does not account for all of the slight 
differences in the crewmembers in terms of the job roles that held and qualifications that 
had. The averages and worst cases will be summarized as a way to determine in which 
situation the values exceeded or did not meet the presumed threshold of the Navy 
Standard Work Week. 
  
Fire Control Technician (FT) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1354.62 9.03 63.22 53.98
Watch 1097.70 7.32 51.23 43.74
Sleep 921.19 6.14 42.99 36.71
Maint 315.15 2.10 14.71 12.56
Watch Prep 90.20 0.60 4.21 3.59
Training 36.50 0.24 1.70 1.45
Network Issues 49.63 0.33 2.32 1.98
Electrical Casualty 19.17 0.13 0.89 0.76
Flood 9.80 0.07 0.46 0.39
Fire 10.11 0.07 0.47 0.40
FT Casualties 2.94 0.02 0.14 0.12
Eat 308.84 2.06 14.41 12.31
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.71 1230.04 8.20 139.34 118.98
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 The resource data was then summarized into duty hours and personal hours to 
determine the weekly utilization and compared to the prescribed Navy Standard Work 
Week (NSWW). The NSWW is simply defined by 81 duty hours and 87 non-duty hours 
which includes personal time, sleep, messing and Sunday free time. The Baseline 
utilization summary can be seen below in Table C-10. 
 
  
Electronic Technician (ETC) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1597.30 10.65 74.54
Watch 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sleep 843.09 5.62 39.34
Maint 746.71 4.98 34.85
Watch Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 15.00 0.10 0.70
Network Issues 16.18 0.11 0.76
Electrical Casualty 35.36 0.24 1.65
Flood 13.65 0.09 0.64
Fire 12.13 0.08 0.57
Radio Casualties 2.09 0.01 0.10
Eat 318.48 2.12 14.86
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours
0.68 1161.57 7.74 113.79
Fire Control Technician (FTSN) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1610.38 10.74 75.15
Watch 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sleep 854.79 5.70 39.89
Maint 744.74 4.96 34.75
Watch Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 16.00 0.11 0.75
Network Issues 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electrical Casualty 27.19 0.18 1.27
Flood 13.65 0.09 0.64
Fire 12.13 0.08 0.57
FT Casualties 0.00 0.00 0.00
Eat 321.12 2.14 14.99
Weekly Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours
0.67 1175.91 7.84 113.12
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 The utilization summary shows that the worst case ET was actually the worst 
utilization of 0.68 for ETs and the average FT was the worst utilization of 0.71 for FTs. 
Each of these values are highlighted in a bright yellow in figure 7. It can also be seen that 
each rating is more than 40% over utilized compared to the NSWW. Since duty time is 
indirectly proportional to non-duty time, when duty time increases non-duty time 
decreases. This is evident in that each rating is over 40% deficient in personal time which 
accounts for all sleep. In fact in the model, sleep accounts for all personal or non-duty 
time outside of eating which means if the 2 prescribed NSWW hours of messing and 2 
prescribed hours of personal time are subtracted from the total personal or non-duty time 
in figure 2 of 8.2 hours it can be seen that each crewmember is sleeping for 
approximately 4 hours on average. 4 hours is clearly not meeting the expected NSWW.   
 The final takeaway from the baseline data is when failed events are compared to 
utilization. If the events were allowed to restart it would significantly impact utilization. 
Utilization would increase and personal time would decrease directly impacting sleep 
time. This impact will be analyzed in more depth later in this analysis. 
 The Baseline results set the objective for the project model runs. The baseline 
seems to indicate that the VIRGINIA class submarine is over utilized in the current state 
before the additional air warfare systems. It is not the goal of the project to correct 
current deficiencies in the already designed and operational VIRGINIA class submarine. 
The IMPRINT model goal is to meet or exceed the baseline; in other words, no additional 
failed events and no utilization higher than the identified worst utilizations when 
compared to the initial baseline model. It is also important to note here that the project 
team was unable to obtain every specific detail regarding such factors as maintenance 





















Duty 81 115.98 143.2% 113.36 140.0% 118.98 146.9% 113.79 140.5% 113.12 139.7%
Personal Time                     
(Sleep, Personal Time, Eating) 87 52.02 59.8% 54.64 62.8% 49.02 56.3% 54.21 62.3% 54.88 63.1%
Utilization 0.48 0.69 143.2% 0.67 140.0% 0.71 146.9% 0.68 140.5% 0.67 139.7%






VIRGINIA class submarine platform may be manned sufficiently; however, the 
assumptions that were made for this project do not prove that to be the situation. 
 
B.  SUBMARINE LASER SYSTEM MODEL RESULTS 
  
The IMPRINT Forces model was simulated with the additional inputs for the air 
warfare laser system with the existing manning from the VIRIGINA class ship’s manning 
document. The event activity status summary for the Submarine Laser System Model 
produced the following results seen in Table C-11. 
 
Table C-11. Submarine Laser System activity summary. 
 
Unplanned Activity Scheduled Started Successful Interrupted Delayed Failed 
CEC Issues 74 72 72 0 0 2 
Electrical Casualty 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Fire 5 5 5 0 0 0 
Flooding 6 6 6 0 0 0 
FT Casualties 10 10 10 0 0 0 
Laser Firing Event 6 6 6 0 0 0 
Laser System 
Malfunction 
6 6 6 0 0 0 
Link-16 Issues 146 144 144 0 0 2 
Maintenance 1031 947 816 131 0 84 
Network Issues 146 142 138 4 0 4 
Radio Casualties 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Training 51 47 45 0 0 4 
WSN-7 Failure 6 6 6 0 0 0 
Total Failures 52 
 
 
 The activity summary shows that 1,519 events started but resulted in a total of 96 
failures. This is 44 more failures than the 52 failed events seen in the baseline model. The 
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individual resource data was analyzed similarly to the baseline in Tables C-12 through 
Table C-16 by taking the averages and worst case individual data sets. The data sets are 
provided as a reference source in the discussion to follow. 
 




All Total Hours Avg Hours per Day Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1108.97 7.39 51.75 46.95
Watch 1097.51 7.32 51.22 46.46
Sleep 947.72 6.32 44.23 40.12
Maint 316.18 2.11 14.76 13.38
Watch Prep 91.97 0.61 4.29 3.89
Training 30.30 0.20 1.41 1.28
Network Issues 29.17 0.19 1.36 1.23
Electrical Casualty 19.74 0.13 0.92 0.84
Flood 8.12 0.05 0.38 0.34
Fire 11.00 0.07 0.51 0.47
Radio Casualties 1.93 0.01 0.09 0.08
FT Casualties 1.98 0.01 0.09 0.08
Eat 279.22 1.86 13.03 11.82
Laser Firing Event 4.00 0.03 0.19 0.17
WSN-7 Failure 4.01 0.03 0.19 0.17
Link-16 Issues 5.82 0.04 0.27 0.25
CEC Issues 7.92 0.05 0.37 0.34
Laser System Malfunction 3.03 0.02 0.14 0.13
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.69 1226.95 8.18 127.94 116.06
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Electronic Technician (ET) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 957.96 6.39 44.70 42.71
Watch 1098.56 7.32 51.27 48.98
Sleep 960.65 6.40 44.83 42.83
Maint 292.42 1.95 13.65 13.04
Watch Prep 92.61 0.62 4.32 4.13
Training 27.66 0.18 1.29 1.23
Network Issues 12.50 0.08 0.58 0.56
Electrical Casualty 20.77 0.14 0.97 0.93
Flood 7.84 0.05 0.37 0.35
Fire 10.03 0.07 0.47 0.45
Radio Casualties 1.93 0.01 0.09 0.09
Eat 264.61 1.76 12.35 11.80
Laser Firing Event 4.67 0.03 0.22 0.21
WSN-7 Failure 4.46 0.03 0.21 0.20
Link-16 Issues 8.51 0.06 0.40 0.38
Laser System Malfunction 2.60 0.02 0.12 0.12
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.67 1225.26 8.17 118.65 113.37
Fire Control Technician (FT) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1310.32 8.74 61.15 52.17
Watch 1095.05 7.30 51.10 43.60
Sleep 930.49 6.20 43.42 37.05
Maint 347.86 2.32 16.23 13.85
Watch Prep 90.46 0.60 4.22 3.60
Training 32.94 0.22 1.54 1.31
Network Issues 52.51 0.35 2.45 2.09
Electrical Casualty 18.37 0.12 0.86 0.73
Flood 8.48 0.06 0.40 0.34
Fire 12.30 0.08 0.57 0.49
FT Casualties 1.98 0.01 0.09 0.08
Eat 298.71 1.99 13.94 11.89
Laser Firing Event 3.33 0.02 0.16 0.13
WSN-7 Failure 3.42 0.02 0.16 0.14
Link-16 Issues 1.51 0.01 0.07 0.06
CEC Issues 7.92 0.05 0.37 0.32
Laser System Malfunction 3.64 0.02 0.17 0.14
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.71 1229.20 8.19 139.54 119.06
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Electronic Technician (ETC) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1469.19 9.79 68.56
Watch 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sleep 868.80 5.79 40.54
Maint 832.56 5.55 38.85
Watch Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 17.88 0.12 0.83
Network Issues 16.88 0.11 0.79
Electrical Casualty 42.74 0.28 1.99
Flood 11.36 0.08 0.53
Fire 12.18 0.08 0.57
Radio Casualties 4.06 0.03 0.19
Eat 291.87 1.95 13.62
Laser Firing Event 8.00 0.05 0.37
WSN-7 Failure 9.78 0.07 0.46
Link-16 Issues 14.49 0.10 0.68
Laser System Malfunction 0.19 0.00 0.01
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours
0.68 1160.67 7.74 113.84
Fire Control Technician (FTSN) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1672.66 11.15 78.06
Watch 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sleep 853.93 5.69 39.85
Maint 669.92 4.47 31.26
Watch Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 24.00 0.16 1.12
Network Issues 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electrical Casualty 26.45 0.18 1.23
Flood 9.14 0.06 0.43
Fire 12.18 0.08 0.57
FT Casualties 0.00 0.00 0.00
Eat 326.52 2.18 15.24
Laser Firing Event 0.00 0.00 0.00
WSN-7 Failure 1.91 0.01 0.09
Link-16 Issues 0.00 0.00 0.00
CEC Issues 0.00 0.00 0.00
Laser System Malfunction 3.30 0.02 0.15
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours
0.67 1180.45 7.87 112.91
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 The utilizations for each resource table was summarized and compared to the 
Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW). Table C-17 shows the Submarine Laser System 
utilization summary: 
 




The utilization summary shows that the worst utilization is equal to the worst 
utilization seen in the baseline model. However this model failed 44 more events than the 
baseline. Had the events been able to restart it would have significantly impacted the 
utilization in order to pass more events. This indicates that the VIRGINIA class 
submarine will require additional manning augments in order to absorb the additional air 
warfare systems. This is the basis for augmenting the submarine with additional 
personnel since as explained previously their utilization remains the same but the number 
of events that they fail increases with an increasing level of work. 
 
C. SUBMARINE LASER SYSTEM WITH AUGMENTED MANNING 
 
 The project team started with 1 additional crewmember and increased that 
manning number until a value was achieved that met or exceeded the failed events of the 
initial baseline model’s results. It was determined that the required augment needed to 
achieve the baseline was 4 personnel - 2 ETs and 2 FTs. The event activity status 























Duty 81 116.06 143.3% 113.37 140.0% 119.06 147.0% 113.84 140.5% 112.91 139.4%
Personal Time                     
(Sleep, Personal Time, Eating) 87 51.94 59.7% 54.63 62.8% 48.94 56.3% 54.16 62.3% 55.09 63.3%
Utilization 0.48 0.69 143.3% 0.67 140.0% 0.71 147.0% 0.68 140.5% 0.67 139.4%




Average All Average ET Average FT Worst Case ET Worst Case FT
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Table C-18. Augmented manning activity summary. 
 
Unplanned Activity Scheduled Started Successful Interrupted Delayed Failed 
CEC Issues 74 72 74 0 0 0 
Electrical Casualty 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Fire 5 5 5 0 0 0 
Flooding 6 6 6 0 0 0 
FT Casualties 10 10 10 0 0 0 
Laser Firing Event 6 6 6 0 0 0 
Laser System 
Malfunction 
10 10 10 0 0 0 
Link-16 Issues 146 146 146 0 0 0 
Maintenance 969 922 853 69 0 47 
Network Issues 142 142 142 0 0 0 
Radio Casualties 14 14 14 0 0 0 
Training 52 52 49 3 0 0 
WSN-7 Failure 6 6 6 0 0 0 
Total Failures 47 
 
The activity summary shows that 1,454 events started and resulted in a total of 47 
failures. This is 5 less failures than the 52 failed events seen in the baseline model. It is 
again important to note that these events take place over a period of 150 days and 
therefore provide a good statistical average of the most probable numbers to expect based 
upon the assumptions used in the submarine model. The individual resource data was 
analyzed similarly to the baseline and is shown in Tables C-19 through C-24 by taking 
the averages and worst case individual data. 
  
 69 









All Total Hours Avg Hours per Day Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1357.04 9.05 63.33 54.93
Watch 1099.27 7.33 51.30 44.50
Sleep 937.84 6.25 43.77 37.96
Maint 248.53 1.66 11.60 10.06
Watch Prep 92.18 0.61 4.30 3.73
Training 29.11 0.19 1.36 1.18
Network Issues 22.55 0.15 1.05 0.91
Electrical Casualty 15.35 0.10 0.72 0.62
Flood 6.31 0.04 0.29 0.26
Fire 8.56 0.06 0.40 0.35
Radio Casualties 1.93 0.01 0.09 0.08
FT Casualties 1.65 0.01 0.08 0.07
Eat 311.60 2.08 14.54 12.61
Laser Firing Event 3.00 0.02 0.14 0.12
WSN-7 Failure 3.75 0.02 0.17 0.15
Link-16 Issues 4.51 0.03 0.21 0.18
CEC Issues 4.93 0.03 0.23 0.20
Laser System Malfunction 2.43 0.02 0.11 0.10
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.70 1249.43 8.33 135.38 117.43
Electronic Technician (ET) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1201.26 8.01 56.06 50.78
Watch 1099.56 7.33 51.31 46.48
Sleep 950.10 6.33 44.34 40.16
Maint 247.56 1.65 11.55 10.46
Watch Prep 92.80 0.62 4.33 3.92
Training 27.53 0.18 1.28 1.16
Network Issues 10.02 0.07 0.47 0.42
Electrical Casualty 15.44 0.10 0.72 0.65
Flood 6.87 0.05 0.32 0.29
Fire 7.87 0.05 0.37 0.33
Radio Casualties 1.93 0.01 0.09 0.08
Eat 295.85 1.97 13.81 12.51
Laser Firing Event 4.00 0.03 0.19 0.17
WSN-7 Failure 4.37 0.03 0.20 0.18
Link-16 Issues 6.99 0.05 0.33 0.30
Laser System Malfunction 2.27 0.02 0.11 0.10
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.69 1245.96 8.31 127.33 115.33
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Fire Control Technician (FT) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours Normalized Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1551.77 10.35 72.42 59.75
Watch 1098.61 7.32 51.27 42.30
Sleep 922.50 6.15 43.05 35.52
Maint 249.75 1.66 11.65 9.62
Watch Prep 90.73 0.60 4.23 3.49
Training 30.70 0.20 1.43 1.18
Network Issues 38.65 0.26 1.80 1.49
Electrical Casualty 15.24 0.10 0.71 0.59
Flood 5.61 0.04 0.26 0.22
Fire 9.41 0.06 0.44 0.36
FT Casualties 1.65 0.01 0.08 0.06
Eat 331.28 2.21 15.46 12.76
Laser Firing Event 6.20 0.04 0.29 0.24
WSN-7 Failure 2.60 0.02 0.12 0.10
Link-16 Issues 0.96 0.01 0.04 0.04
CEC Issues 4.93 0.03 0.23 0.19
Laser System Malfunction 2.60 0.02 0.12 0.10
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours Normalized Weekly Duty Hours
0.71 1253.78 8.36 145.11 119.72
Electronic Technician (ET2 #4A) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1593.25 10.62 74.35
Watch 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sleep 856.34 5.71 39.96
Maint 713.90 4.76 33.32
Watch Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 27.88 0.19 1.30
Network Issues 12.40 0.08 0.58
Electrical Casualty 33.66 0.22 1.57
Flood 11.36 0.08 0.53
Fire 12.18 0.08 0.57
Radio Casualties 2.81 0.02 0.13
Eat 311.22 2.07 14.52
Laser Firing Event 0.00 0.00 0.00
WSN-7 Failure 11.39 0.08 0.53
Link-16 Issues 11.77 0.08 0.55
Laser System Malfunction 1.84 0.01 0.09
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours
0.68 1167.56 7.78 113.51
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 The utilizations for each resource table was summarized and compared to the 
NSWW. Table C-24 shows the predictions of the augmented model. 
 




 The utilization summary shows that the Augmented Submarine worst utilization is 
equal to the worst utilization seen in the baseline model which was expected as explained 
thoroughly earlier in this project report. However this model failed 5 less events than the 
baseline. This shows that 4 augmented personnel, 2 ETs and 2 FTs, are required for the 
VIRGINIA class submarine to absorb the air warfare weapons systems without 
increasing the workload on the already existing over-utilized crew-members.  
Fire Control Technician (FT2 #4A) Total Hours Daily Hours Weekly Hours
Off Watch 1414.11 9.43 65.99
Watch 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sleep 898.12 5.99 41.91
Maint 872.03 5.81 40.69
Watch Prep 0.00 0.00 0.00
Training 17.00 0.11 0.79
Network Issues 53.24 0.35 2.48
Electrical Casualty 22.01 0.15 1.03
Flood 9.23 0.06 0.43
Fire 10.46 0.07 0.49
FT Casualties 3.19 0.02 0.15
Eat 285.69 1.90 13.33
Laser Firing Event 2.00 0.01 0.09
WSN-7 Failure 1.91 0.01 0.09
Link-16 Issues 2.61 0.02 0.12
CEC Issues 7.18 0.05 0.34
Laser System Malfunction 1.22 0.01 0.06
Total Utilization Total Personal Hours Personal Hours Per Day Weekly Duty Hours





















Duty 81 117.43 145.0% 115.33 142.4% 119.72 147.8% 113.51 140.1% 112.76 139.2%
Personal Time                     
(Sleep, Personal Time, Eating) 87 50.57 58.1% 52.67 60.5% 48.28 55.5% 54.49 62.6% 55.24 63.5%
Utilization 0.48 0.70 145.0% 0.69 142.4% 0.71 147.8% 0.68 140.1% 0.67 139.2%
Average FT Worst Case ET Worst Case FTSubmarine with Laser System 




Average All Average ET
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D. PERSONNEL LIFECYCLE COST 
  
The increased augment of 4 personnel would have a significant cost impact. The project 
assumed that each augment would be an E-5 with 6 years of service. This assumption is 
very reasonable since the qualifications expected to be either a maintainer or an operator 
of an advanced combat system such as a laser would be expected that the individual have 
an adequate experience level. This would result in base pay, basic housing allowance 
(BAH), basic allowance for sustenance (BAS), submarine pay, and sea pay. There would 
also be a significant cost for healthcare, support services, and training. For simplicity the 
project ignored these costs and only used pay and allowances to project a lifecycle cost. 
Table C-25 is a summary of the pay and allowance costs for 4 augmented personnel for 
48 ships over a lifecycle of 33 years. The VIRGINIA class submarine program has 
planned to build 48 ships in this class and each ship has an expected service life of 33 
years. Table C-25 provides all of the individual cost drivers used to predict the overall 
cost impact to the VIRGINIA class program for its 33-year lifecycle to be approximately 
$518 million. 
 






E. FAILED EVENT IMPACTS ON UTILIZATION 
 
 The Forces model was set to fail events over restarting as previously stated 
because it does not impact increasing utilization accurately as stated in the previous 
sections of this report. Therefore it’s pertinent to determine what the impact of these 
failed events would have on the resources of the personnel assigned. The failed events are 
summarized in Table C-26 below and separated into three columns of each of the 
characteristic models that were analyzed in this project. 
 







with 4 Augments 
CEC Issues 0 2 0 
Electrical Casualty 0 0 0 
Fire 0 0 0 
Flooding 0 0 0 
FT Casualties 0 0 0 
Laser Firing Event 0 0 0 
Laser System Malfunction 0 0 0 
Link-16 Issues 0 2 0 
Maintenance 44 84 47 
Network Issues 5 4 0 
Radio Casualties 0 0 0 
Training 3 4 0 
WSN-7 Failure 0 0 0 
Total Failures 52 96 47 
 
 Using the mean time for each failed event’s distribution an overall resource value 
for the failed events can be determined. In doing this a daily and weekly resource impact 
to each individual can be determined by taking the total weekly or daily hours of the 
failed events and dividing them by the total manning compliment. This is a rough 
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calculation because the event durations are normally distributed and not every technician 
is qualified to respond to every event, but it does give a rough indication of the failed 
events impact to the human resources. The resource impact to personnel had they covered 
the failed events can be seen in Table C-27 below. 
 




Table C-27 shows the weekly impact to every person’s personal or non-duty time. 
For instance, in the Submarine with Laser model, had the personnel actually successfully 
accomplished the failed events every person in the model would have forfeited 1.5 hours 
of personal time. In other words these personnel would achieve 1.5 hours less sleep. In 
the Submarine Baseline model section of this report it was determined that all personnel 
were getting approximately 4 hours of sleep per day. This increased utilization of 
successfully accomplishing the failed events would cause that previously predicted 4 
hours of sleep per day for every person to drop to approximately only 3 hours and 40 
minutes per day. This amount of sleep is unsustainable for an individual for any 
significant period of time. 
  








Event Failure Total Time 201 449.67 235
Event Failure Daily Time 1.34 3.00 1.57
Event Failure Weekly Time 9.38 20.98 10.97
Daily Impact to All Personal Time -0.10 -0.21 -0.09




The results provided an interesting perspective into the current VIRGINIA class 
submarine manning. Based upon the assumptions that were made in this project, it was 
clearly evident that the two enlisted ratings there were reviewed were undermanned for 
their expected number of potential activities that they might need to respond to. This was 
not a completely unexpected outcome at the start of the project though it is very 
important to highlight this initial workload manning deficit. 
 The focus of this project was to determine if the hypothesis that adding the air 
warfare mission area to a submarine would create the need to add additional personnel to 
the submarine to manage the increased workload. The hypothesis was clearly validated 
from the simulations conducted based upon the submarine models created. The results 
concluded that 4 additional personnel, 2 from each enlisted rate studied would be needed 
when a High Energy Laser weapon system suite is integrated into a VIRGINIA class 
submarine platform.  
 This project provided a broader learning perspective that must be considered 
when any sub-system is introduced to an already built system. The broader learning 
perspective is that human factors engineering must be considered when integrating a sub-
system into an already built system and not simply assume that the current operators and 
maintainers will be capable of absorbing the additional workload. While this project did 
not introduce the peculiarities of a crewmember’s training or education for the newer 
sub-system, it is easy to understand how important these would be when introducing a 
new sub-system. Not only would it be necessary to study and analyze the level of training 
and education necessary for the new sub-system, it would be equally important to analyze 
the effects of what that time for the new sub-system would take away from the training 




VI. FURTHER AREAS FOR RESEARCH 
 
 Research should be further conducted looking into current VIRGINIA class 
submarine manning levels without the laser weapon system. This additional research and 
analysis will help to determine the potential of the crew to absorb any additional 
workload from the integration of any sub-system. In this project, 4 additional 
crewmembers were determined to be necessary for the integrated laser weapon system; 
however, the project was scoped in such a way to not conduct analysis into the additional 
impacts from these personnel such as berthing, messing, and all standard habitability 
requirements. 
 Another approach for further analysis for the integration of a laser weapon system 
onto a submarine platform would be to model the entire submarine crew. This would 
provide a more robust understanding of the entire crew’s personal utilization rates and 
which crewmembers may be able to absorb an increase in workload more than the 
enlisted rates that were studied in this project. Also, not only should all of the current 
VIRGINIA class enlisted rates be reviewed and studied to determine which may be the 
best candidates to be trained in the use and maintenance of the systems needed for the 
conduct of air warfare but additional enlisted rates not currently onboard a submarine 
should be included in the study. An additional rate that could be very useful for a 
submarine with an integrated air warfare weapon system might be an Operational 
Specialist (OS). The OS rate might prove to be an enlisted member that could be well 
trained and provide valuable experience for the current submarine enlisted ratings. 
Furthermore, additional analysis might be very useful in the area of different watch-
standing conditions such as battle-stations or condition 1, general quarters. This will help 
to provide additional understanding as to the more specific effects of personal utilization 
in various conditions of battle. 
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VII. FINAL IMPRINT SOFTWARE DISCUSSION / RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 The IMPRINT software tool was used to conduct this analysis and was found to 
be extremely effective though it was not particularly user-friendly. The analysis began by 
building the submarine model using the Littoral Combat Ship model 
(LCS_FREEDOM_40.imprint) built by the thesis team of Renaldo N. Hollins and Kelly 
M. Leszczynski of December, 2014. Using the LCS model the analysis team was able to 
quickly and effectively read the format and structure of the software. After a short period 
of learning (about 4-6 hours of use) some of the requirements and limitations of the 
software was found to be more than sufficient for our needs to the point that a significant 
amount of extra data entry was necessary to meet the software requirements but had no 
bearing on the problem that was being researched. Specifically, highly detailed watch 
schedules were needed to be crafted and used but ultimately were not variable in the 
research. Additionally, a more user-friendly watch-section interface would have been 
helpful, as the current program requires each event to be scheduled sequentially starting 
at 0000 on the first day and continuing until the end of the watch period length. On that 
note, when typing in a data field it would seem that the presence of a blinking cursor to 
indicate the location of where typing will occur was sporadic at best.  
 Positive points of the software include the fact that much of the personnel 
information, such as detailed rates and specialties are pre-programmed. An example of 
this is the fact that while there is one Electronics Technicians (ETs) rate in the Navy, the 
specialty of an ET on a submarine is very different than an ET in the Nuclear Field and 
significantly different than an ET in the advanced electronics field, and all three different 
ETs are selections in the software. Furthermore, the software provided flexibility in 
allowing user-defined job roles to personnel regardless of rate and specialty, thus 
allowing multiple different rated personnel to be required to respond to different planned 
and unplanned casualties. In this project the job role capability was used to define 
specific qualifications or skills so that some of the ETs were qualified to be radio 
technicians while others are not.  
 Another significant difficulty was discovered in the handling of maintenance 
onboard a submarine. Maintenance for a submarine is handled by off-watch personnel 
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who will complete the maintenance during the scheduled period. Any maintenance that 
for some reason is not accomplished during that time period would be either passed on to 
the next off-watch personnel or would be accomplished during the designated sleeping 
period. As there was no way found to do this in IMPRINT, the choice was made to make 
maintenance an unplanned event with duration corresponding to assumed average 
maintenance length. The loophole that was found in the program is that when 
maintenance is interrupted, realistically it will take additional time to accomplish as the 
stopping and starting of the procedures are not instantaneous. This additional time for 
resuming work after a break cannot be added into each of the events, thus, resuming 
maintenance continues throughout the deployment with no requirement for scheduling or 
any ‘drop dead’ dates.  
 Overall, IMPRINT was found to be a very powerful and effective tool to 
accomplish what was needed to be done. While it is possible that this could have been 
accomplished using some familiar but intense programming in Microsoft Excel, 
IMPRINT was the right choice in this circumstance. The team did not have sufficient 
time during the course of research to fully dive into what the program could do, leaving 
many questions as to whether or not the limitations encountered could have been resolved 
with additional time or training in the software, though learning all of the finer details of 
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APPENDIX D: PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY CONDUCTED BY 
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